

## Message Text

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FOLLOWING REPEAT NATO 694 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
MOSCOW GENEVA MBFR VIENNA 10 FEB

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 0694

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, NATO, CSCE  
SUBJ: CSCE: FEBRUARY 7 NAC CONSULTATIONS

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE AND USDEL SALT II

REF: USNATO 0674

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. ALL DAY NAC SESSION ON CSCE, AT-  
TENDED BY MOST GENEVA DELEGATION HEADS, BEGAN WITH ITALIAN  
PRESENTATION, ALONG FAMILIAR LINES, OF EC-NINE POSITIONS  
AGREED AT DUBLIN. DISCUSSION THEREAFTER FOCUSED ON CBM'S  
AND CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP. ON FORMER, MAJORITY FAVORED  
OR LINKAGE BETWEEN PACE OF WORK ON CBM'S AND PRINCIPLES  
DECLARATION. US PREFERRED TO HOLD SUCH AN APPROACH  
UNTIL LATER, IN EVENT SOVIETS REMAIN TOTALLY NEGATIVE ON  
CBM'S. NETHERLANDS PROPOSED NEW APPROACH TO FIXING THRES-  
HOLD FOR MANEUVER PREANNOUNCEMENT (SEE PARA 6). LENGTHY  
DISCUSSION OF CSCE FOLLOW-UP REVEALED NO SHIFT IN WELL-  
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KNOWN NATIONAL POSITIONS: FRANCE, FRG, ITALY, NETHERLANDS,  
BELGIUM AND TURKEY VERY RESERVED FORWARD REGULAR  
POLITICAL FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS; UK, NORWAY AND DENMARK  
MORE POSITIVE. DISCUSSION OTHER ISSUE RATHER PER-

FUNCTORY, BUT CANADA EXPLICITLY CRITICIZED PROPOSED QUADRIpartite disclaimer in principles declaration, CLAIMING ITS LANGUAGE WOULD APPEAR TO AFFIRM SOVIET SUPREMACY IN EASTERN EUROPE. MOST EXPRESSED GUARDED SATISFACTION ON PACE OF WORK IN GENEVA. BUT SOME SPEAKERS INTERPRETED SOVIET RIGIDITY SO FAR ON SUBSTANTIVE POINTS AS OPENING MOVE IN TACTIC DESIGNED TO LEAVE IMPORTANT ISSUES UNRESOLVED UNTIL LATE IN STAGE II, IN EXPECTATION THAT TIME PRESSURE WOULD THEN FORCE WESTERN AND NEUTRAL PARTICIPANTS TO ACCEPT MINIMAL RESULTS. FULL TEXT OF AMBASSADOR SHERER'S STATEMENT, AS DELIVERED, SENT SEPTTEL. END SUMMARY.

2. PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS. MOST EXPRESSED QUALIFIED SATISFACTION WITH PACE OF WORK SO FAR IN GENEVA, NOTING THAT PROGRESS IS USUALLY SLOW IN FIRST THREE-FOUR WEEKS AFTER A BREAK IN THE TALKS. MOST THOUGHT SOVIET ATTITUDE WAS ONE OF BUSINESS AS USUAL, BUT SEVERAL ALSO REFERRED TO SOVIET RIGIDITY ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. NETHERLANDS (VAN DER VALK), ECHOED BY FRG AND BELGIUM, SAID IT IS NORMAL SOVIET TACTIC TO DRAG THINGS OUT IN PENULTIMATE PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS, IN HOPE OF BRINGING INTENSE TIME PRESSURE ON OPPOSING SIDE DURING FINAL PHASE. IN VIEW OF THESE DELEGATIONS, "WAR OF NERVES" MAY HAVE ALREADY BEGUN, AND WEST SHOULD NOT ALLOW ITSELF TO BE PUT UNDER TIME PRESSURE.

3. CBM'S. ALL WHO SPOKE EXPRESSED CONCERN AT SLOW PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. MOST EC-NINE DELEGATIONS ARGUED FOR ESTABLISHING SOME FORM OF PARALLELISM BETWEEN PROGRESS ON CBM'S AND ON PRINCIPLES DECLARATION. NETHERLANDS, FRG, AND BELGIUM WERE PARTICULARLY EMPHATIC ON THIS POINT AND WERE SUPPORTED BY NORWAY AND TURKEY. UK WAS MORE RESERVED. NORWAY (MEVIK) STATED FORCEFULLY THAT THE SOVIETS MUST NOT GET IDEA CONFIDENTIAL

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THEY CAN WAIT UNTIL THE VERY END OF STAGE II AND THEN OBLIGE THE WEST TO ACCEPT MINIMAL CBM AGREEMENT. MEVIK ALSO REITERATED NORWEGIAN PROPOSAL FOR VOLUNTARY NOTIFICATION OF SMALL MANEUVERS AND OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS.

4. U.S. (SHERER) EXPRESSED CONCERN AT LACK OF PRIOR CONSULTATION BY NINE WITH U.S. BEFORE PUTTING LIKAGE QUESTION TO SOVIET DELEGATION IN GENEVA. SHERER ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT U.S. COULD CONSIDER JOINING IN BILATERAL APPROACHES TO SOVIETS, OR IN RAISING SUBJECT IN COORDINATING COMMITTEE. RESPONDING, BELGIUM (HERPIN) SAID NINE DID NOT ADVOCATE RIGID

LINK WITH WORK ON PRINCIPLES DECLARATION. HOWEVER, SOVIETS MUST BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY CANNOT "GET AWAY WITH" REFUSING ANY CONCESSIONS ON CBM'S, WHILE OTHER CONFERENCE WORK MOVES AHEAD NORMALLY. ITALY (FERRARIS) SAID NINE HAD ALWAYS FAVORED APPROXIMATE PARALLELISM BETWEEN ALL ASPECTS OF CSCE WORK. THUS THE PROPOSED CBM-PRINCIPLES "LINKAGE" WAS NO NEW DEPARTURE.

5. FRG (BLECH) EXPRESSED HOPE THAT NINE-S POSITION ON CBM-PRINCIPLES LINKAGE WOULD BECOME THAT OF FIFTEEN. ALLIES SHOULD BEGIN WORK TO DEVELOP OUTLINE OF AN ACCEPTABLE FINAL TEXT OF CBM'S, BEGINNING WITH LANGUAGE ALREADY REGISTERED IN GENEVA AND ADDING PORTIONS COVERING AREAS ON WHICH THERE WAS NOT YET ANY EAST-WEST AGREEMENT. IN SETTING OUT VIEWS BLECH SAID THAT TWO THINGS WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE FRG: NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS ONLY IN FRONTIER ZONES; AND NOTIFICATION ONLY TO NEIGHBORING STATES.

6. NETHERLANDS (VAN DER VALK) SUGGESTED NEW APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF CBM PARAMETERS, CALLING IT "A NATIONAL POSITION" AND SUGGESTING ALLIANCE SHOULD STUDY IT. VAN DER VALK SAID FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO MOVE GENEVA DISCUSSION AWAY FROM MILITARY TECHNICALITIES AND TRY TO GET GENERAL AGREEMENT ON POLITICAL VALUE OF CBMS. NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH ROUGHLY HOW MANY CONFIDENTIAL

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MANEUVERS PER YEAR WE WOULD WANT EACH SIDE TO ANNOUNCE IN ORDER TO GAIN THOSE POLITICAL BENEFITS. PERHAPS TEN MANEUVERS PER YEAR WOULD BE AN OPTIMUM NUMBER. NETHERLANDS HAS IMPRESSION THAT, IF NATO PARAMETERS WERE USED, EACH SIDE WOULD BE NOTIFYING IN THE ORDER OF 100 MANEUVERS PER YEAR, AND THAT WOULD BE TOO MANY. IF SOVIET PARAMETERS WERE USED AS BASIS, PERHAPS ONLY ONE MANEUVER WOULD BE ANNOUNCED ANNUALLY AND THAT WOULD BE TOO LITTLE. ONCE AN OPTIMUM ANNUAL NUMBER OF MANEUVER ANNOUNCEMENTS HAS BEEN AGREED UPON, THE ALLIES CAN WORK BACK FROM THERE TOWARD SPECIFIC PARAMETER THAT WOULD YIELD THAT RESULT.

7. AT CONCLUSION OF DISCUSSION, ASYG PANSALASKA ASKED IMS TO PROVIDE ESTIMATES OF NUMBER OF MANEUVERS THAT WOULD BE ANNOUNCED UNDER VARIOUS THRESHOLD PROPOSALS ON TABLE IN GENEVA.

8. CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP. ITALY, FRANCE, FRG AND OTHERS TOOK RESERVED VIEW OF REGULARIZED FOLLOW-UP. FRENCH REP (PIERRET) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHED VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS ISSUE. THE DANISH PROPOSAL ALREADY

REPRESENTS A COMPROMISE, AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT" FOR FRANCE TO GO FURTHER. FRENCH ARE NOT PERSUADED THAT INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS BEGUN IN HELSINKI IS NECESSARILY TO THE WESTERN ADVANTAGE. PIERRET PLACED GREAT STRESS ON THE NEED TO VERIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE AGREEMENTS BEFORE DECIDING QUESTION OF REGULAR FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES; TO DO THIS, A FAIRLY LONG INTERIM PERIOD BETWEEN CSCE AND FIRST MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIALS WOULD BE NECESSARY. FRG (BLECH) ECHOED THIS POINT AND ADDED THAT TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF TECHNICAL FOLLOW-UP WOULD ALSO FLOW FROM CSCE. BLECH IMPLIED THAT ALLIES WOULD WISH TO EVALUATE THIS WORK TOO BEFORE AGREEING TO ANY SCHEME FOR REGULAR POLITICAL FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS.

9. PREDICTABLY, UK, NORWAY AND DENMARK WERE MORE SANGUINE ABOUT THE VALUE TO THE WEST OF REGULAR FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS. UK (BURNS), REFERRING TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S PAPER ON THE SUBJECT, SAID WEST CAN RESIST THE DANGERS  
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OF REGULAR FOLLOW-UP ACTIVITIES AND SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE ADVANTAGES. POST-CSCE INTERIM PERIOD SHOULD NOT BE TOO LONG. DENMARK (MELLBIN) SAID ALLIES SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE DETERMINATION OF ROMANIANS, OTHER EASTERN EUROPEANS AND THE NEUTRALS ON THE FOLLOW-UP ISSUE.

10. NORWAY SAID THAT EXPERIENCE AT HELSINKI AND GENEVA SHOWED THAT AN EXTENDED PROCESS OF MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WAS NOT HARMFUL TO THE WEST AND COULD INDEED YIELD SOME POSITIVE RESULTS. THE PRESENT DANISH PROPOSAL IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE NEUTRALS AND THE EASTERN EUROPEANS; SPECIFICALLY, THE INTERIM PERIOD PROPOSED IS TOO LONG. NORWAY WOULD PREFER A MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIALS WITHIN A YEAR OR SO OF CONCLUSION OF CSCE TO TAKE STOCK OF THE SITUATION, REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION OF CSCE AGREEMENTS AND FIX TIME AND PLACE FOR FURTHER SUCH MEETINGS. NORWAY ASSUMES SEVERAL POST-CSCE MEETINGS OF SENIOR OFFICIALS WOULD TAKE PLACE. COMMENT: THIS CONFORMS

CLOSELY WITH NORWEGIAN STATEMENT MADE IN GENEVA IN APRIL 1974; SEE GENEVA 4418 OF NOVEMBER 11 FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS. END COMMENT.

11. PRINCIPLES. DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC FOLLOWED USUAL THEMES AND BROKE NO NEW GROUND, EXCEPT FOR CANADIAN CRITICISM OF DISCLAIMER ON QUADRIPARTITE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (QRR). CANADA UNDERSTOOD THE PROBLEM BUT DID NOT LIKE THE GENERAL WORDING OF THE TEXT; IT APPEARS TO AFFIRM SOVIET SUPREMACY IN

EUROPE, AND A SOVIET OFFICIAL HAD SAID, IN A CONVERSATION WITH A CANADIAN COUNTERPART, THAT THE LANGUAGE WOULD GUARANTEE THE RESULTS OF WORLD WAR II. FRANCE AND UK SPOKE BRIEFLY IN SUPPORT OF QRR FORMULA.

12. BASKETS II AND III. DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES WAS BRIEF AND PERFUNCTORY. PORTUGAL (ALMEIDA) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD INSIST THAT, IF THE BASKET II PREAMBLE WAS TO REFER TO LDC QUESTION, IT SHOULD USE PHASE "DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN EUROPE"; "LESS DEVELOPED  
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COUNTRIES" IS NOT RPT NOT GOOD ENOUGH. ALTERNATIVELY, PORTUGAL COULD ACCEPT NO RPT NO REFERENCE AT ALL TO THIS PROBLEM IN CSCE CONTEXT.

13. LEGAL DIFFICULTIES WITH CSCE TEXTS. US INFORMED NAC OF MANNER IN WHICH WE INTEND TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. SEVERAL EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR US APPROACH TO QUESTION. ALL WHO SPOKE TO THIS ISSUE EMPHASIZED THAT CSCE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT PRODUCE LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT.

14. MEDITERRANEAN-MALTESE PROPOSAL. US REITERATED ITS CONCERNS ON MALTESE PROPOSAL. PORTUGAL CONCURRED, SAYING IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KILL MALTESE SUGGESTION GENTLY. ITALY AGREED MALTESE PROPOSAL HAD NO FUTURE BUT SAID IT WAS DELICATE MATTER AND ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE APPROPRIATE TACTICS. BRUCE UNQUOTE INGERSOLL

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